Managua by Rodgers, Dennis
  
Dennis Rodgers
Managua 
 
Book section 
 
 
Original citation: 
Originally published in Koonings, K and Kruijt, Dirk (eds.) Fractured cities: social exclusion, 
urban violence and contested spaces in Latin America.  London, UK : Zed Books, 2006, pp. 71-
85 
 
© 2007 Zed Books  
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28434/
 
Available in LSE Research Online: August 2010 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s submitted version of the book section. There may be differences 
between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s 
version if you wish to cite from it. 
vContents
Tables and ﬁgures | vii Acknowledgements | viii
  Introduction: the duality of Latin American cityscapes 1
kees koonings and dirk kruijt
 1 Fractured cities, second-class citizenship and urban violence 7
kees koonings and dirk kruijt
Urban poverty, desborde popular and the erosion of the formal social 
order | 8 From desborde popular to desborde de la violencia: con- 
ceptualizing exclusion, insecurity and violence | 11 Armed actors  
and violence brokers | 14 The politics of urban violence | 17
Parallel power and perverse integration | 19
 2 Rio de Janeiro 23
elizabeth leeds
Favela-related violence | 24 Impact on education | 25 Motives for 
involvement in drugs trading | 26 Police and community – negative 
dialogues | 27 Political-administrative constraints | 30 Police over- 
sight and the lack of political will – costs and consequences | 32
Conclusions | 34
 3 Mexico City 36
wil pansters and hector castillo berthier
Violence as fact and phantom | 36 Metropolitan structure and  
security governance | 38 Patterns and actors of insecurity and  
violence | 40 Governmental and societal responses and strategies | 47
Conclusions | 53
 4 Medellín 57
ralph rozema
A history of urban violence in Medellín | 58 Daily life under guerrillas  
and paramilitaries | 60 A promising peace process with the para- 
militaries | 65 Concluding remarks | 69
 5 Managua 71
dennis rodgers
Barrio Luis Fanor Hernández: past and present | 73 Drugs, material  
vi
wealth and conspicuous consumption | 75 Consumption,  
cultural exclusion and predation | 79 Violence and primitive  
accumulation | 80 Conclusion | 84
 6 Caracas 86
roberto briceño-león
Divided Caracas | 86 The advent of violence in Caracas | 88
Forms of violence | 93 Fear as an urban sentiment | 96
The loss of the city | 97 Democracy and violence in the city | 99
 7 Lima Metropolitana 101
dirk kruijt and carlos iván degregori 
City of informales | 102 New social actors and new forms of popular 
organization | 105 Low-intensity violence | 110 Conclusion | 113
 8 Living in fear: how the urban poor perceive violence, fear  
and insecurity 117
cathy mcilwaine and caroline o. n. moser
The diversity and complexity of violence among the urban  
poor | 118 Urban poor constructions of fear: social fragmentation 
and spatial restrictions | 120 The legitimization of violence among  
the urban poor I: the emergence of perverse social organizations | 125 
The legitimization of violence among the urban poor II: inadequate  
state security and judicial protection | 131 Non-violent coping:  
a gendered response | 134 Conclusions | 135
  Epilogue: Latin America’s urban duality revisited 138
dirk kruijt and kees koonings
About the authors | 142 Bibliography | 144
Index | 161
71
5 | Managua
D E N N I S  R O D G E R S
This chapter explores the emergence of new forms of urban segregation in 
contemporary Managua, Nicaragua. Although the country has historically 
always been characterized by high levels of socio-economic inequality – with 
the notable exception of the Sandinista revolutionary period (1979–90), when 
disparities declined markedly – the past decade in particular has seen the 
development of new processes of exclusion and differentiation, especially 
in urban areas. In many ways, these are part of a broader regional trend; as 
several recent studies – including the other chapters of this volume – have 
noted, many other Latin American cities are undergoing similar mutations. 
The seminal investigation in this regard is undoubtedly Caldeira’s City of 
Walls (2000), which traces the way in which rising crime and insecurity have 
changed the cityscape of São Paulo, Brazil, transforming it from a space of 
open circulation to a fragmented archipelago of isolated ‘fortiﬁed enclaves’. 
This new urban morphology is most visible in the proliferation of self-suf-
ﬁcient gated communities and closed condominiums for the afﬂuent, which 
have signiﬁcantly altered the character of urban space as those on the ‘inside’ 
of the enclaves no longer relate to notions of spatial cohabitation with those 
on the ‘outside’, but rather to an ideal of separation from them.1
In urban Nicaragua, the phenomenon has arguably gone farther than 
simply enclaves. As I have detailed elsewhere (Rodgers 2004a), urban segrega-
tion has in fact developed through a process of ‘disembedding’ rather than 
fragmentation. Partly because of the small size of the Managua elite, what 
has emerged instead of gated communities and closed condominiums is a 
‘fortiﬁed network’, which has been constituted through the selective and 
purposeful construction of high-speed roads connecting the spaces of the 
elites within the city: their homes, ofﬁces, clubs, bars, restaurants, shop-
ping malls and the international airport. The poor are excluded from these 
locations by private security, but also from the connecting roads, which are 
cruised at breakneck speeds by expensive 4x4 cars, and have no trafﬁc lights 
but only roundabouts, meaning that those in cars avoid having to stop – and 
risk being carjacked – but those on foot risk their lives when they try to cross 
a road. The general picture, in other words, is one whereby a whole ‘layer’ 
of Managua’s urban fabric has been ‘ripped out’ of the metropolis for the 
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exclusive use of the city elites, thereby profoundly altering the cityscape and 
the relations between social groups within it.
Such processes of segregation and exclusion are largely being driven by 
the afﬂuent urban elites, both in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Latin America. 
This is obvious in the nature of the urban transformations themselves, but 
also becomes apparent when one ‘follow[s] the money’, as the Watergate mole 
‘Deep Throat’ – aka Mark Felt – famously advised. Managua’s transformation 
coincided with the accession to power of Arnoldo Alemán, whose presidency 
between 1997 and 2001 came to epitomize the new oligarchy that emerged in 
Nicaragua from the ruins of the Sandinista revolution and the post-conﬂict 
peace process (see Rocha 2002), and at whose beneﬁt the city’s mutations 
are clearly directed. The vast majority of the infrastructural changes to Mana-
gua’s cityscape were in fact ﬁnanced by the Ofﬁce of the Presidency – rather 
than the Managua municipality, which actually saw its budget signiﬁcantly 
reduced – and were moreover among the few of Alemán’s actions that were 
uncontested by the Sandinista opposition, the upper ranks of which have 
themselves become part of the new oligarchy. Overall, several hundreds of 
millions of US dollars were spent on what can arguably be said to constitute 
an orchestrated top-down process of urban transformation that is primarily 
to the advantage of the city elites and not the impoverished majority of the 
population.
While it is clearly critically important to consider this top-down perspec-
tive, it also arguably constitutes something of a case of ‘elite-centrism’. I use 
the term ‘elite-centrism’ not because I think that contemporary analyses of 
urban segregation in Latin American cities favour elites – few of them do 
– but rather to point to the fact that such processes are generally always 
seen as ﬂowing ‘from above’, and are almost exclusively explored in relation 
to the fortiﬁed enclaves or networks of the elites. These, however, have an 
inevitable ﬂipside in the form of concomitant ‘zones of exclusion’, where 
the vast majority of the excluded live and frequently eke out a living on 
limited resources. The dynamics of this ‘planet of slums’ – to use Davis’s 
(2004) evocative expression – are just as worthy of consideration, as they are 
characterized by bottom-up processes that are also leading to critical urban 
mutations, including in particular the development of forms of what might 
be labelled ‘urban segregation from below’. This chapter presents a case 
study of such processes in a poor Managua neighbourhood called Barrio Luis 
Fanor Hernández,2 drawing on ethnographic ﬁeld research carried out in 
1996/97 and 2002/03.3 In particular, it explores how the emergence of a local 
drugs economy in the late 1990s led to a process of profound socio-economic 
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differentiation in the neighbourhood, fostering a range of different types of 
cultural and material exclusion. The chapter describes these in detail and 
relates them to wider structural factors and processes, including a political 
economy of Nicaragua’s general economic predicament.
Barrio Luis Fanor Hernández: past and present
Barrio Luis Fanor Hernández is a low-income neighbourhood located in 
south-east Managua. It was founded in the early 1960s by squatters on what 
was then fallow farmland on the outskirts of Managua, and rapidly became 
informally known as La Sobrevivencia, due to the fact that it was reputedly 
one of the poorest neighbourhoods in the city where ‘people were always 
hungry and nobody did anything other than survive’, according to a long-time 
resident called Don Manuel. Following the Sandinista revolution in 1979, 
the neighbourhood beneﬁted from the new regime’s urban reconstruction 
programme and was completely rebuilt in 1980/81. Under the supervision 
of government personnel, and with materials donated by the Cuban govern-
ment, local inhabitants collectively built basic housing for themselves, as well 
as roads, paths, drains and public spaces.4 This reconstruction programme 
called for follow-up maintenance by the state, however, and this never materi-
alized, partly because public resources became increasingly diverted towards 
ﬁnancing the costly civil war that affected the country from the mid-1980s 
onwards. The neighbourhood infrastructure rapidly began to decay, and by 
the time I ﬁrst visited Barrio Luis Fanor Hernández in 1996, the majority of 
houses were falling apart, and the neighbourhood infrastructure was deterio-
rating badly. Public spaces had been converted into rubbish dumps, cracks 
and potholes blemished roads and paths, and drains were blocked and no 
longer working.5
This infrastructural decay was mirrored socio-economically. Although the 
neighbourhood was never well off by any stretch of the imagination during 
the 1980s, even after being reconstructed, the revolutionary regime ensured 
that at the very least nobody went hungry, through the general distribution 
of basic food rations to poor households. Following regime change in 1990, 
many barrio inhabitants felt that their living conditions declined, and indeed, 
by the mid-1990s the situation had become so bad that many residents were 
saying: ‘We’ve come full circle back to the time of La Sobrevivencia.’ Certainly, 
according to a survey that I carried out in Barrio Luis Fanor Hernández in 
November 1996, the neighbourhood unemployment rate was over 45 per cent, 
with a further 25 per cent of those economically active underemployed.6 There 
was little local economic enterprise in the neighbourhood apart from theft 
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and delinquency, and there were moreover few opportunities outside the 
barrio either, especially for a labour force that tended to be unskilled. Most 
of those who worked did so in the informal sector, and the median monthly 
income was around 700 córdobas (about US$85 at the time) – although many 
earned less. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the strains on the social fabric were 
such that it was no exaggeration to talk about a veritable ‘atomization’ of 
social life (see also Nitlapán-Envío team 1995; Núñez 1996). In spite of this 
social fragmentation, however, there was nevertheless a certain socio-eco-
nomic uniformity to the barrio, with very few individuals or households being 
visibly better off than the rest.
I expected little to have changed when I returned to Barrio Luis Fanor 
Hernández in 2002 – considering that Nicaragua’s macroeconomic situation 
had not improved – and it therefore came as a great surprise when one of 
the ﬁrst things I observed on entering the neighbourhood was clear signs 
of signiﬁcant economic improvement. Most obviously, much of what had 
been a relatively uniform neighbourhood of ramshackle, mainly wooden 
houses had been very visibly ameliorated, with many houses now made of 
brick and concrete, as well as having been expanded. Moreover, I counted 
over a dozen cars in the barrio streets as I walked into the neighbourhood 
– and subsequently recorded that there were a total of seventy-two cars in 
the barrio, most of which evidently belonged to the households in front of 
which they were parked. This was in striking contrast to ﬁve years previously, 
when there had been just ﬁve car-owners in the neighbourhood. Finally, as 
I greeted old friends and acquaintances, it was immediately obvious that a 
signiﬁcant number were dressed in better-quality clothes than before, many 
wore ostentatious gold jewellery and designer sunglasses, and some even 
had mobile telephones (and this in a neighbourhood where only a dozen 
households had had land lines in the mid-1990s).
Although this was not what I had come to research – I had returned pri-
marily to conduct a follow-up study to my previous investigations on gang 
violence in the neighbourhood (Rodgers 2000) – I straight away set about 
trying to ﬁnd out what was fuelling this process of economic improvement. 
One immediately obvious fact was that the betterment was not universal. 
Many houses in the neighbourhood remained unchanged compared to ﬁve 
years previously, and moreover neither roads nor drains had been improved, 
public spaces continued to be rubbish dumps, and public lighting was still 
non-existent. As such, the source of the economic improvement was likely 
private rather than public. It was also a process that seemed to affect different 
parts of Barrio Luis Fanor Hernández differently – there seemed to be more 
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economic improvement in the ‘arriba’ (western) side of the neighbourhood 
than in the ‘abajo’ (eastern) side – and moreover differently compared to 
surrounding neighbourhoods. Although there were signs of economic im-
provements in all of these, they were occurring on a lesser scale. This was 
particularly obvious from the perspective of housing: almost 60 per cent 
of houses in Barrio Luis Fanor Hernandez had improved compared to the 
mid-1990s, but in surrounding neighbourhoods only about 20 per cent bore 
any signs of major upgrading.
Drugs, material wealth and conspicuous consumption
It quickly became apparent that there were actually three distinct proc-
esses contributing to the economic development and concomitant socio-eco-
nomic differentiation visible in Barrio Luis Fanor Hernández and surrounding 
neighbourhoods. Two of these seemed common to all, namely the increased 
sending of remittances by migrants abroad and the spread of credit facilities 
which allowed many with low incomes to buy cars and become taxi-owners 
(see Rodgers 2004b). The third was drug trafﬁcking, and this occurred in a 
particular way in Barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, to the extent that there is little 
doubt that it constituted the key factor for the almost 40 per cent difference in 
its infrastructural enhancement compared to surrounding neighbourhoods. 
Although there was some drug dealing in the neighbourhoods around Bar-
rio Luis Fanor Hernández, this happened on a very small scale. Indeed, the 
small-time drug dealers that operated in surrounding neighbourhoods would 
generally come and buy their wares in Barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, which 
by all accounts had become one of Managua’s principal drug distributing 
neighbourhoods, where drugs were brought in from outside the city and from 
where they were disseminated within.
Drug dealing was by no means new to Barrio Luis Fanor Hernández. In the 
mid-1990s, marijuana had been sold in the neighbourhood, albeit only on a 
small scale by two individuals who grew it themselves. Their main clients had 
been the local youth gang. By 2002, however, this artisanal trade had been 
completely superseded by a cocaine-based drugs economy which principally 
involved the sale of crack, better known in Nicaragua as ‘la piedra’, or ‘the 
stone’.7 To a large extent this transformation is linked to broader international 
factors. Owing to improved law enforcement efforts in the Caribbean, the late 
1990s saw a diversiﬁcation of drug trafﬁcking routes from Colombia to North 
America, with ﬂows along the Mexican–Central American corridor increasing 
dramatically. Owing to its proximity to the Colombian Caribbean island of 
San Andrés, Nicaragua is geographically a natural trans-shipment point along 
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this route, but had previously been under-exploited because its transport 
infrastructure was generally very poor and trafﬁc through the country was 
slight, making it difﬁcult to slip drugs shipments through unnoticed. In 
late 1998, however, Nicaragua was devastated by Hurricane Mitch, suffering 
major infrastructure damage and resource drainage. This negatively affected 
the already limited capabilities of local law enforcement institutions, thereby 
facilitating the importation of drugs. Furthermore, post-Mitch reconstruction 
efforts focused largely on rebuilding transport links, and improved these 
substantially, which had the knock-on effect of increasing the volume of 
trafﬁc, which in turn made moving drugs shipments easier.
Drugs trafﬁcking in Central America tends to be a decentralized operation, 
with drugs shipments being passed along a chain of relatively autonomous 
units, which all take a cut by making money distributing a share of the 
drugs locally. Cocaine consequently began to be traded in Barrio Luis Fanor 
Hernández from the mid-1999 onwards, initially on a small scale by just one 
individual but rapidly expanding into a three-tiered pyramidal drugs economy 
by the ﬁrst half of 2000. At the top of the pyramid was the ‘narco’ – also known 
as ‘el más grande’ (‘the biggest’) or ‘el poderoso’ (‘the powerful one’) – who 
brought cocaine into the neighbourhood ‘by the kilo’, according to several of 
my informants.8 The narco only wholesaled his goods, to among others the 
half a dozen ‘púsheres’ in the neighbourhood. Púsheres resold the cocaine 
they bought from the narco in smaller quantities or else ‘cooked’ it into crack 
which they then sold from their houses – ‘expendios’ – to a regular clientele 
that included ‘muleros’, the bottom rung of the drug-dealing pyramid. Muleros 
sold crack in small doses to all comers on barrio street corners, generally in 
the form of ‘paquetes’ costing 10 córdobas (US$0.70) each and containing 
two ‘ﬁxes’, known as ‘tuquitos’.
In total, the Barrio Luis Fanor Hernández drugs pyramid directly involved 
twenty-nine individuals: one narco, nine púsheres and nineteen muleros. The 
narco, púsheres and muleros all originated from the barrio, and interestingly 
were all gang members or ex-gang members, or else linked to the latter. 
Sixteen of the nineteen muleros were members of the local youth gang – the 
‘pandilla’ – and the other three were ex-gang members. The narco was an 
ex-gang member from the early 1990s and all the púsheres were either ex-gang 
members from the mid-1990s or else partners of ex-gang members (all the 
muleros were males, as was the narco, but two of the púsheres were women). 
The narco and púsheres often hired people – generally members of their 
household – to help them out, but a large number of barrio inhabitants were 
also indirectly involved in the drug economy, acting as ‘bodegueros’, stashing 
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drugs in their houses for the narco or for púsheres in exchange for payment 
(the narco or púsheres spread their stocks of drugs in different places in order 
to keep only easily disposable quantities in their homes in case of a Police 
raid – although this was an extremely rare occurrence, and corrupt police-
men would often provide tip-offs – but in this way they also involved other 
households in the trade and minimized the risk of denunciation).
Bodegueros were generally paid between 200 and 1,000 córdobas (US$15–
70) to stash drugs, depending on the quantity and the length of time they had 
to be stored, which constituted a substantial sum of money in a context where 
the median wage was about 1,500 córdobas (US$105). Those more directly 
involved in the drugs trade made much more, however. But at the top of the 
pyramid, although the narco’s proﬁts from drugs dealing were clearly very 
substantial, we are not talking about the multi-million sums associated with 
the drugs trade in the popular imagination. I have little speciﬁc information 
to offer about either the narco or the púsheres’ proﬁts, but it was obvious from 
their consumption patterns that both made a sizeable proﬁt. The former 
clearly made much more than the latter, however. The narco could afford two 
houses in the neighbourhood – where he maintained a wife and a mistress, 
as well as half a dozen children, in afﬂuent style – one in a neighbouring 
barrio, another in a richer part of the city, and he had built a new house for 
his parents, who were living in the neighbourhood. Moreover he owned a 
ﬂeet of eight taxis, as well as two more cars for his own personal use, and a 
couple of large motorcycles. Furthermore, the narco also regularly bestowed 
favours on his immediate neighbours by distributing free food and lending 
them money interest free or at a reduced rate compared to market prices.
The púsheres publicly ﬂaunted their wealth by building gaudy, ostentatious 
houses frequently painted in bright colours – yellow, spearmint green, pink 
– which more often than not had extravagant ﬁttings – in one case, crystal 
chandeliers (hanging from a corrugated-iron roof) – and exotic furniture such 
as rococo full-length mirrors, as well as luxurious home appliances such as 
wide-screen televisions, mega-wattage sound systems and Nintendo game 
consoles. Almost all owned at least one car, and some had two homes, one 
to live in and one to sell their drugs from. Púsheres also often wore obviously 
expensive brand-name clothes – Lacoste, Polo Ralph Lauren, Benetton – gold 
jewellery and luxury watches, and made a point of drinking costly drinks such 
as whisky instead of rum, smoked foreign-brand cigarettes, and shopped in 
Managua’s two supermarkets rather than in the markets, thereby differenti-
ating themselves from the rest of the barrio population. Interestingly, the 
narco somewhat paradoxically cut a rather shabby ﬁgure in comparison to the 
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púsheres. He generally dressed down, and rarely wore gold jewellery or other 
items of obvious luxury. He frequently ﬂaunted his wealth in other ways, how-
ever. While neither of his houses in the neighbourhood was as ostentatious as 
those of púsheres, both the one he built for his parents and the one he had 
in the neighbouring barrio were two-storey buildings – a rarity in Barrio Luis 
Fanor Hernández and indeed in Managua more generally. Furthermore, the 
narco would also regularly drive through the neighbourhood on one of his mo-
torcycles, notoriously accosting passing women – whether single or not – and 
offering them substantial sums of money to sleep with him, thereby signalling 
his power and impunity within the strictures of machismo that frame so much 
of social life in contemporary Nicaragua (see Montoya 2003). 
Although the narco and the púsheres obviously moved greater quantities 
of drugs, even at the lowest level of the drugs dealing pyramid, that of the 
muleros, the rewards were potentially substantial. Muleros bought crack from 
púsheres in the form of tucos, nuggets about the size of the ﬁrst phalange of 
the thumb, for 500 córdobas (US$36) each. They would then cut (‘picar’) the 
tucos into tuquitos – each tuquito was about 2 square millimetres in size, 
with a variable weight of 0.10–0,50 grams – which they would then wrap in 
aluminium foil, and put into paquetes of two. Each paquete was sold for a 
standard price of 10 córdobas (US$0.70). On average, a mulero would sell forty 
to ﬁfty paquetes a day, with peaks of eighty to one hundred paquetes on Fridays 
and Saturdays, and lows of ten to twenty on Sundays.9 Each tuco bought for 
500 córdobas would yield between 160 and 190 tuquitos, depending on the 
mulero’s cutting skills and also how much he kept for his own consumption. 
This in turn corresponded to eighty to ninety-ﬁve paquetes, which given that 
these sold at 10 córdobas each meant that the proﬁt on each 500-córdoba 
outlay was between 300 and 450 córdobas (US$22–32), although 12 córdobas 
have to be discounted for a roll of aluminium foil, and a further 5 córdobas 
for the small plastic bags in which muleros put the tuquitos.
In other words, at the bottom of the drug-dealing pyramid, a mulero could 
make between 5,000 and 8,500 córdobas (US$350–600) proﬁt per month, 
equivalent to between three and ﬁve times the average Nicaraguan wage; as 
such, it can be contended that such low-level drug dealing constituted one 
of the most proﬁtable economic opportunities available to youth at the local 
level. Like the púsheres, albeit more modestly, the muleros generally sported 
good-quality clothes – often global brand names such as Nike, for example 
– as well as gold chains, rings and also Walkmans and portable CD players. 
They would in addition spend considerable amounts of money on cigarettes 
and alcohol, although generally local brands only rather than foreign goods, in 
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contrast to the púsheres. At the same time, however, similarly to the púsheres, 
the muleros devoted substantial proportions of their wealth to improving the 
material conditions of their households, and also those of their extended 
families in the barrio. In a neighbourhood that was over forty years old, this 
meant that the trappings of drug-fuelled economic development extended far 
beyond just those directly involved in the trafﬁcking, to the extent that from 
a nucleus of about thirty individuals up to 40 per cent more households in 
Barrio Luis Fanor Hernández were visibly better off than in non-drug-dealing 
neighbourhoods. For those who did not fall in the 40 per cent of neighbour-
hood households that were better off, however, life seemed to continue much 
as it had in the mid-1990s.
Consumption, cultural exclusion and predation
In a recent article describing how the illegal drugs trade affected and 
transformed the rural small-town community of Buenavista in the central 
highlands of Mexico, McDonald (2005: 120) argues that a drug economy can 
be ‘a powerful source of cultural as well as economic change through the 
routinized forms of everyday cultural practice that lead to transformations of 
existing activity, organization, and identity’. In particular, McDonald contends 
that the cultural routinization of the drugs trade in Buenavista – as reﬂected 
in the proliferation of particular architectural forms (opulent housing), the 
presence of luxury commodities (expensive cars and designer clothes) and the 
adoption of non-traditional patterns of consumption (high-stake betting at 
cockﬁghts) – has generated inequalities that go beyond simple quantitative 
differences in material wealth. Drawing on Appadurai (1996), he maintains 
that although consumption is obviously an important economic process, it 
is even more critical as a cultural practice through which people constitute 
and deﬁne themselves as social beings, and that – implicitly arguing that 
they constitute a class of ‘cultural entrepreneurs’ – the emergent drug-dealing 
elite in Buenavista and their new patterns of consumption have become the 
primary source of symbolic inspiration for the construction of local identities 
in the community, thereby reshaping it ‘in subtle and not so subtle ways’ 
(McDonald 2005: 117).
Obvious among these changes are the adoption of new consumer practices 
by local community members not involved in the drugs trade, more and more 
of whom seek to adopt the trappings of a drug-trafﬁcking lifestyle that is seen 
to epitomize the apex of social accomplishment, for example buying what 
they can in the way of designer clothes and sartorially imitating drug dealers. 
But what these signal at a less apparent underlying level are fundamental 
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transformations of what can be termed – after Taylor (2002) – the ‘local social 
imaginary’. The new consumption patterns of the drug-dealing elite alter no-
tions of what it is to imagine and to be a member of the community, and this 
leads to what McDonald (2005: 118) refers to as ‘slippage’. The drug-dealing 
elite and non-drug-dealing members of the local community enter into acts 
and rituals of consumption differently, and ﬁnd themselves as a result starkly 
distinguished from one another. Although both groups imagine their identi-
ties through the same forms of consumption, only the former can actually 
afford them, meaning that the latter are constantly reminded of what they 
lack, and end up feeling an acute sense of relative deprivation, or, to put it 
another way, ﬁnd themselves culturally excluded. From this perspective, the 
rise of the drugs trade and the associated conspicuous consumption patterns 
of drug dealers can be said to generate powerful forms of social disjuncture 
within the local community that go far beyond the solely material.
Such an analysis is very attractive when one considers Veblen’s (1902) 
original characterization of the notion of ‘conspicuous consumption’, 
whereby he maintains that it is a process that revolves primarily around socio-
cultural differentiation rather than material wealth. Indeed, Veblen (ibid.: 
68) actually argues that ‘the beginning of a differentiation in consumption 
even antedates the appearance of anything that can fairly be called pecuniary 
strength’. There is evidence to suggest that this is perhaps true in the case of 
Barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, where the drugs trade was intimately associated 
with the local gang. Certainly, the gang in the 1990s had constituted a locus 
of particular social practices such as binge drinking, smoking marijuana and 
wearing Nike shoes that could arguably be seen as progenitorial to contem-
porary forms of conspicuous consumption, although it should be noted that 
gang members were far from being in any way wealthy (see Rodgers 2006). 
Moreover, the better off part of Barrio Luis Fanor Hernández – the ‘arriba’ 
side – corresponded spatially more or less exactly to what had been in the 
mid-1990s the territory of the age cohort of the gang that became the nucleus 
of the gang in 2002. At the same time, this association is perhaps most in-
teresting when considered in the light of Veblen’s claim that differentiation 
is ultimately traceable back to what he calls ‘predatory culture’. From this 
perspective, the political economy of the violence that surrounds the drugs 
trade in Barrio Luis Fanor Hernández becomes particularly signiﬁcant.
Violence and primitive accumulation
By all accounts the neighbourhood had become a much more violent 
place since the development of a drugs economy. To a certain extent, this 
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was due to the neurological effects of crack consumption. Crack enhances 
aggressiveness, and makes individuals less predictable. As a barrio inhabitant 
called Adilia explained to me: ‘The problem is that now, anybody could be a 
potential danger, if they’ve smoked some crack, any time … you can’t know 
what they’re going to do, with this drug people become more violent, more 
aggressive, they don’t care about anything, they don’t recognize you ... you 
don’t know what they’re thinking or even if they’re thinking at all, they could 
just kill you like that, without a thought … ’
Everybody I talked to in Barrio Luis Fanor Hernández told me without 
exception that insecurity had worsened since the emergence of crack, and 
in particular that there had been an increase in brutal robberies, assaults 
and common delinquency. This was certainly supported by my observations 
of everyday barrio life during my return visit in 2002, when it was apparent 
that there were more acts of spontaneous, unpredictable violence occurring 
on a daily basis than in the mid-1990s. These were indeed more often than 
not linked to crack consumption. It was extremely frequent to see drugged-
up gang members stopping neighbourhood inhabitants in the streets of the 
barrio and asking for a few córdobas to buy another ﬁx. If their request was 
refused or ignored, they would frequently become violent, lashing out with a 
ﬁst, pulling out a knife or wildly swinging a machete. Indeed, weapons such 
as knives and machetes, but also guns – I witnessed four shoot-outs during 
the course of two months in the barrio in 2002 – were used much more 
frequently than in the past, and often openly carried about, which had not 
been the case previously.
At the same time, although crack consumption was clearly important in 
explaining these increased levels of violence and insecurity, it can also be 
argued that these were to a larger extent a consequence of the nature of 
the drugs trade itself. A drugs economy cannot rely on formal mechanisms 
of regulation and contract enforcement such as the law owing to the fact 
that drugs are illicit goods. Alternative informal mechanisms are necessary 
in order to impose regularity on drug transactions, and as has widely been 
pointed out within the social sciences, perhaps the most basic form of social 
regulation is achieved through the use and threat of violence. Seen in this way, 
it was no accident that the drugs trade became dominated by members or 
ex-members of the local gang. Indeed, in many ways it can in fact be argued 
that there existed something of a ‘contingent compatibility’ between the 
gang and the drugs trade (see Rodgers forthcoming). As a small, tightly-knit 
group that was the dominant source of violence in the neighbourhood – to 
the extent that it held a quasi-monopoly over public forms of brutality and 
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fundamentally organized local-level social life in the barrio as a result – the 
gang was well placed to provide the brutal forms of informal regulation 
required for sustainable drugs trafﬁcking when drugs ﬁrst arrived in the 
neighbourhood.
Although mulero gang members conducted their drug dealing on an in-
dividual basis, the gang as a group acted in a coordinated manner to ensure 
the proper functioning and protection of the barrio drugs economy, providing 
security services to the narco and to the púsheres, and making certain that 
transactions proceeded smoothly. Gang members would enforce contracts, 
roughing up recalcitrant clients, as well as guarding drugs shipments as they 
were moved in and out of the barrio. They would also make sure that clients 
could enter the neighbourhood unmolested by either the local population 
or outsiders. Neighbourhood inhabitants, however, lived under a veritable 
regime of terror. Gang members would strut about the streets, menacingly 
displaying their guns and machetes, repeatedly warning barrio inhabitants of 
the potential retribution that would befall them if they denounced them or 
others involved in the drugs trade, and backing these threats with violence. 
On one occasion in March 2002, the gang beat up the son of an elderly 
neighbourhood inhabitant who lived next to a púsher, as a warning after 
she had harangued and thrown a bucket of water on crack buyers who had 
knocked on her door by mistake late one night.
Seen in this light, the intimate relationship between violence and drugs 
trafﬁcking in Barrio Luis Fanor Hernández potentially points to the latter 
being a process that bears comparison with Marx’s (1976) famous notion 
of ‘primitive accumulation’.10 According to Marx, capitalism was at its most 
basic founded upon a unique social relationship between two opposing but 
inescapably linked social groups: on the one hand a class of capitalists with 
a virtual monopoly over the means of production, and on the other hand a 
property-less proletariat that had been dispossessed of their means of produc-
tion and subsistence, and consequently had only their labour as a resource. 
The necessary pre-condition for capitalist development was therefore the 
differentiation of society into these two social classes, and ‘primitive ac-
cumulation’ was the expression Marx used to designate the means through 
which this differentiation occurred. This generally involved the burgeoning 
capitalist class violently dispossessing embryonic proletarians of their means 
of production in order to be able to exploit the labour that they are then 
subsequently forced to sell in order to survive. The analogy with the Barrio 
Luis Fanor Hernández drugs economy is not perfect because the drug-deal-
ing elite was not exploiting the local population in the way Marx envisioned 
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capitalists exploiting the proletariat. It is nevertheless worth thinking about 
in view of the extensive process of socio-economic differentiation that oc-
curred in the barrio owing to the drugs trade, and the fact that – following 
McDonald (2005) – drugs trafﬁcking can be seen as transforming the basis 
of consumption-based local social imaginaries in a way that amounts to a 
form of symbolic dispossession. The larger question such an analysis rises, 
however, is why such a process of ‘primitive accumulation’ should occur in 
a neighbourhood like Barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, which is theoretically 
already integrated within the wider Nicaraguan economy.
In this respect, it is illuminating to turn to Davis’s (2004; see also 2006) re-
cent work on ‘urban involution’ and the rise of an informal global proletariat, 
where he describes the way in which most cities are now principally made up 
of slums populated by a vast underclass that is increasingly excluded from 
contemporary production processes and left to survive by its own devices. 
These are the inevitable ﬂipside of the existence of ‘fortiﬁed enclaves’, where 
the afﬂuent have decided to live in ‘splendid isolation’, and constitute ‘a fully 
franchised solution to the problem of warehousing the twenty-ﬁrst century’s 
surplus humanity’ (Davis 2004: 28) in an age of technology and information-
based economies. Davis goes on to ask the obvious question as to whether 
these ‘slums of exclusion’ are not ‘volcanoes waiting to erupt’, and suggests 
that a range of responses are potentially possible, from the emergence of 
‘some new, unexpected historical subject’ that will challenge the process of 
urban segregation that has been imposed from above to ‘ruthless Darwin-
ian competition’ within the slums, ‘as increasing numbers of poor people 
compete for the same informal scraps, ensur[ing] self-consuming communal 
violence as yet the highest form of urban involution’.
What the case study presented in this chapter suggests is that it is the 
latter option which seems to emerge. The processes in Barrio Luis Fanor 
Hernández described above have to be situated within the larger context of 
the top-down process of urban segregation that has occurred in Managua 
(see Rodgers 2004a). The process of ‘disembedding’ of the city has not only 
separated an autonomous ‘layer’ of the metropolis for the rich, but has also 
created large ‘zones of exclusion’ where the impoverished city masses attempt 
to survive as best they can. A Hobbesian social order has arguably emerged 
within these zones, where the principal concern of those inhabiting them is 
material survival, and only the strongest and ﬁttest can attempt to establish 
means of enrichment that go beyond mere subsistence, for example through 
violent economic practices such as drugs trafﬁcking (indeed, this is perhaps 
a particularly appropriate way of conceptualizing drugs trafﬁcking consider-
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ing that it is a paradigmatic form of ‘savage’ capitalism – something that 
also makes the link to a putative process of ‘primitive accumulation’ all the 
more attractive). From this perspective, the drugs trade in Barrio Luis Fanor 
Hernández constitutes an attempt to create a form of economic organization 
that goes beyond mere survival in a context of rampant poverty and enforced 
isolation from the wider social unit of the city.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored what might be termed forms of ‘urban segrega-
tion from below’. Drawing on a case study of a poor Managua neighbourhood 
called Barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, I focused on the way in which the emer-
gence of a local drugs economy led to signiﬁcant forms of socio-economic 
differentiation, which were particularly well reﬂected in the new conspicuous 
consumption of drug dealers that have changed local cosmologies and sym-
bolic frameworks. As important as consumption behaviour may be, however, 
as Rothstein (2005: 298) points out – citing Douglas and Isherwood (1979: 
4) – ‘consumption has to be set back into the social process’. Although dif-
ferentiation can be elaborated through consumption, it is ultimately created 
outside consumption, and therefore ‘consumption practices must be viewed 
in terms of class, political economy and material reality’ (Rothstein, 2005: 
283). In this regard, it is illuminating to consider the process of micro-level 
social differentiation and economic development that I observed in Barrio 
Luis Fanor Hernández through the lens of Marx’s notion of ‘primitive ac-
cumulation’, the primary characteristic of which is the violent separation of 
society into capitalists and proletariat, through the former dispossessing the 
latter of their means of production. Although the analogy is not perfect, it 
allows us to think more broadly about why the drugs trade has emerged at 
the micro-level in urban Nicaragua, in essence as an attempt to establish a 
viable form of economic livelihood that goes beyond mere subsistence.
In many ways, the emergence of such desperate forms of micro-level eco-
nomic organization is not surprising considering Nicaragua’s macroeconomic 
predicament, which according to Robinson (1998) can be labelled a state of 
‘mal-development’. Certainly, the country has been caught in a vicious cycle 
of economic stagnation, suffering severe and increasing disequilibria relative 
to the global economy. The economy is structurally constrained given its 
import and export structure, imports having a high inelasticity of demand, 
while exports have a high elasticity of demand. Traditional export sectors are 
moreover increasingly uncompetitive in a hemispheric context where there 
are few possibilities for the development of new export sectors (all the more 
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so following the Central American Free Trade Agreement). To this extent, it 
can be contended that poor Nicaraguans – because the country’s elite is to 
a large extent transnational in its economic foundations, and controls the 
few national resources there are – have few options other than to develop 
non-traditional forms of capital accumulation such as drugs trafﬁcking if 
they are to achieve any form of ‘development’ that goes beyond simple sur-
vival. Whether such strategies will lead to more extensive forms of economic 
development, however, in the way Marx envisaged ‘primitive accumulation’ 
giving rise to capitalism, remains to be seen.
Notes
1 Similar processes have been observed in Buenos Aires (Svampa 2001), Mexico 
City (Fischer et al. 2003), Lima and Quito (Borsdorf 2002), and Santiago de Chile 
(Sabatini and Arenas 2000; Salcedo and Torres 2004), among others.
2 A pseudonym, as are all the names of people mentioned in this chapter. Certain 
factual details have also been changed in order to protect the anonymity of the 
neighbourhood.
3 The ﬁrst period of ﬁeldwork was carried out between July 1996 and July 1997 
within the context of a social anthropology PhD programme at the University of 
Cambridge (see Rodgers 2000). The second period was conducted in February/March 
2002 as part of the London School of Economics Crisis States Programme, which also 
sponsored a further visit in December 2002–January 2003.
4 On the Sandinista government’s urban reconstruction programme, see Drewe 
(1986) and Vance (1985).
5 In many ways, this situation was arguably worse than it would have been had the 
neighbourhood not been rebuilt, as cracked paths and drains made of concrete are 
more difﬁcult to repair than dirt roads and hand-dug drainage ditches.
6 The barrio had a population of approximately 3,000 inhabitants and was made 
up of 369 households. My survey sample was made up of 403 individuals in ﬁfty 
households.
7 Cocaine is usually distributed either as cocaine hydrochloride powder or as 
chunky nuggets – known as ‘crack’ – that are a mix of cocaine and sodium bicarbo-
nate boiled in water. Crack is much less expensive than cocaine powder, and is known 
as ‘the poor man’s cocaine’.
8 The narco originally came from Blueﬁelds, which is the principal ﬁrst trans-ship-
ment point on mainland Nicaragua for drugs coming from Colombia via the island of 
San Andrés. He still had family there, and his supply networks were based on these.
9 A signiﬁcant proportion of clients were local barrio inhabitants, but the vast 
majority came from outside the neighbourhood, and included both rich and poor Nic-
araguans, as well as a trickle of foreigners. Most clients came after nightfall, although 
a substantial number came during the day, and there was a deﬁnite predominance of 
men over women.
10 I am grateful to Jo Beall for pointing out this out to me.
